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In this respect David stands apart from the mainstream of macroeconomics, which has been characterized over the years by what he has called an irrational passion for dispassionate rationality. But unlike many other critics of unbounded rationality, David does not put his ideas forth as an attack on free market economics. On the contrary, he has insisted that money is part of the institutional mechanism that helps a decentralized market economy to coordinate people's activities. For example, when demand increases in some sectors and decreases in others, one of the …rst signals that dealers receive is an unanticipated change in cash holdings. Until it is clear that this is going to be permanent, or at least more than momentary, there is no point in changing production, employment or pricing decisions.
Bu¤er stocks allow …rms to keep these activities on schedule without having to make portfolio adjustments every minute of every day, adjustments that would disrupt economic activity in other markets, causing disequilibrium to spread through the system.
To assume that people use convenient heuristic devices for arranging their a¤airs in an uncertain world is not to say that they lack intelligence. On the contrary it is to say that they are smart enough to realize the folly of acting always in Bayesian fashion by fabricating a model of the world and choosing a plan that would be optimal under the incredible assumption that the model was a true representation of reality. Not only would 1 For example, Laidler (1974 Laidler ( , 1984 Laidler ( , 1988 Laidler ( , 1993 sheds useful light on much else that David has written about, not only monetary theory but also monetary policy, its interrelationship with monetary theory, the evolution of Canadian Monetary Policy, and most particularly the policy of in ‡ation targeting which the Bank of Canada and many other central banks around the world are now practicing.
Monetary Policy and Adaptation

The two tasks of monetary policy
A central bank is the sole issuer of the base money on which a country's monetary and …nancial systems rest. Because of this it has two central tasks to perform. First, it needs to ensure that the supply of base money varies enough from day to day so as to avert …nancial panics and collapses of the sort that used to characterize the seasonal shortages of means of payment in the United States in the 19th and early 20th centuries and the periodic banking crises in England in the 19th century. This task requires a central bank to stand ready to act as lender of last resort from time to time. It also requires the central bank to stand ready on a regular basis to buy or sell short-term …nancial instruments at prices that do not ‡uctuate wildly from day to day. In e¤ect, a central bank oversees a country's money market in much the same way, and for much the same reason, that more conventional commercial enterprises manage the markets for the products they buy and sell. That is, to make the market function e¢ ciently it must provide assurance to other transactors that they can trade when they want, on reasonably predictable terms.
The other task of a central bank is to ensure the long-run value of the monetary unit.
To use a well worn metaphor, a central bank is the only agent in an economy in a position to provide a "nominal anchor"for the unit in terms of which contracts are written, accounts are kept and prices are quoted. It does this by controlling the growth in the supply of base money. 3 We have known since Edgeworth, Wicksell and Keynes that unless the supply of base money is controlled, the overall supply of money and credit cannot be controlled, and we have known for even longer that unless the supply of money is controlled the price level cannot be controlled.
Frequently these two central tasks of a central bank con ‡ict with one other. To maintain a well-functioning money market the bank must often dampen interest-rate ‡uctuations by expanding or contracting the monetary base to meet the market's day-to-day demands. But to avoid long-run in ‡ation it must not supply whatever is demanded without limit. Thus there is a constant tension between the two tasks.
In carrying out this di¢ cult balancing act, a central bank must deal with three major sources of di¢ culty: interference from partisan political interests, an ever-diminishing ability to control nominal spending, and lack of understanding of the process by which its own actions a¤ect the course of the price level.
Politics and central banking
As for political in ‡uence, the central banks that have been most successful in controlling in ‡ation have been those with the greatest degree of independence from the executive and legislative branches of government, like the late 20th-century central banks of Germany and Switzerland. 4 The simplest explanation for this phenomenon is that governments …nd it hard to resist demands for de…cit spending when they can rely on a central bank to …nance the de…cits by printing money, whereas the costs of in ‡ation that might result from increased monetary expansion may lie too far in the future to in ‡uence their decisions.
Central bankers that do not enjoy such independence often spend much of their time and e¤ort …nding ways to gain some degree of de facto autonomy that would help insulate them from political pressure. The infamous Coyne a¤air presents a case in point. When it was resolved by the resignation of the governor, his successor, Louis Rasminsky, took directly on the base would con ‡ict with the obligation to maintain a well-functioning money market, especially when, as is now the case in Canada, the base consists entirely in notes. The point is just that whatever instrument the central bank uses must have the e¤ect of limiting the growth rate of the base. 4 See Bade and Parkin (1987) .
o¢ ce only after securing agreement from the government concerning the nature of the joint responsibility of the Bank and the government for the conduct of monetary policy. A crucial part of this agreement was the "directive clause," according to which if ever the governor and the minister of …nance were unable to resolve their di¤erences in private, the Minister could exert ultimate authority, but only by issuing a directive that was to be tabled in the House of Commons. Moreover, the directive would have to specify exactly what instructions the Bank was required to follow, and it would have to specify a limited time period during which the instructions would be binding on the Bank. Although this clause a¢ rmed that the Bank was de jure subordinate to the minister of …nance, all the more so because of the implicit understanding that a governor faced with such a directive would have no choice but to resign, nevertheless it can be argued that it enhanced the Bank's independence in the sense of making it more di¢ cult for a government to exert pressure on the Bank to pursue in ‡ationary policies for partisan political reasons, the sort of pressure from which the Bank is most in need of protection. That is, the threat of dismissal would not be a very credible one with which to exert such pressure because the government would be required to make its reasoning explicit and very public. 
Monetary control
The ever diminishing control over nominal spending that I identi…ed above as the second major di¢ culty that central banks must deal with arises because of the increasing depth and sophistication of …nancial markets in advanced countries. Because of these developments, the base money that a central bank controls is a vanishing part of a country's entire stock of liquidity. This poses the question of how a central bank can continue to provide a nominal 5 There are other levers by which a government might still exert such pressure, as John Crow (2002, ch.2) observes, because of its power to veto a governor's appointment or reappointment and to disapprove salary increases for the governor and deputy governors, but presumably the elimination of one possible lever does help to insulate the Bank to some extent from the pressure.
Crow also rejects Pierre Fortin's (1996) claim that "No sane minister of …nance would ever dare start such a process", on the grounds that there might indeed by circumstances under which a sane minister could produce a well thought-out directive. But it seems unlikely that these circumstances would include cases in which the minister was trying to engineer an in ‡ation without having to pay a price in the short run.
anchor to a system which is coming more and more to resemble Wicksell's imaginary pure credit economy.
When the Bank of Canada wants to tighten monetary conditions it raises the "operating band" whose upper limit is the bank rate and whose lower limit is the rate the Bank will pay on positive balances of participants in Canada's Large Value Transfer System (LVTS).
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This e¤ectively raises the overnight interest rate. If tightness is expected to persist, a chain of substitution will transmit the rise to other interest rates. In turn this rise in domestic interest rates will produce at least an incipient rise in the demand for Canadian dollars on the foreign exchange market as investors shift from foreign to Canadian securities, and the result is likely to be a stronger Canadian dollar.
By a¤ecting interest rates and the exchange rate, Bank of Canada actions can thereby exert an in ‡uence on the ‡ow of aggregate expenditures. Businesses and households facing higher interest rates and/or tougher credit terms will tend to spend less. Businesses, including …nancial intermediaries, will also be less willing themselves to grant credit to their customers, which will reinforce the e¤ects on expenditures by reducing the overall availability of credit 7 in the economy. How this works will depend very much on how expectations react to the tightening of policy. If investors take the tightening as a signal that the Bank is resolved to stem potential in ‡ationary pressures that will require it to maintain its stance for some time, the anticipation of persistent tightening will hasten and amplify the rise in other interest rates and in the exchange rate.
Without supportive expectations, however, a central bank has only limited scope for controlling the level of aggregate expenditures. If no one thought that interest rates beyond the overnight rate would be a¤ected by the Bank's tightening, there would be little e¤ect on the longer-term interest rates that in ‡uence spending decisions in the economy. Nor would there be any point in the Bank trying to intervene directly in longer-term asset markets with the hope of a¤ecting those rates through open market operations without supportive expectations, because …nancial market have grown too large in relation to the Bank's balance sheet. Thus to produce a major e¤ect the Bank must make people believe that the tightening it induces by raising the operating band will continue until it does have an e¤ect. In other words, the "announcement e¤ect"of monetary policy is becoming more and more the primary channel through which a central bank can control aggregate spending.
Understanding the economy
This announcement e¤ect is a psychological phenomenon that rests on prevailing opinion. Direct evidence on the price-formation process 9 suggests that the most common strategy of price-setters is that of full-cost pricing. Individual prices are typically set as a …xed markup over a long-run average of per-unit cost. The major exceptions to this rule arise in the case of import prices, which are often "priced to market," and in the case of basic commodities whose prices vary daily on organized exchanges. Thus it seems that the …rst place in which a change in aggregate demand would a¤ect the overall level of prices would be through its e¤ects on basic commodity prices and on labour costs that respond to ‡uctuations in the derived demand for labour. However, volatile commodity prices typically have a small weight in a comprehensive measure of the price level, and the subsequent feedbacks on the price level that work through costs of manufactured goods to which these commodities are an intermediate input are slow to develop because most price setters do not want their prices to vary with every short-run ‡uctuation in costs. And the e¤ects on wage costs are typically slow to develop because of the prevalence of long-term nominal contracts in labour markets.
Even after basic commodity prices and wages have started to respond to the rise in aggregate demand, the price level may still not be a¤ected, because of the …xed overhead costs prevalent in manufacturing. That is, since the typical …rm operates under conditions of decreasing average cost, the rise in demand will at …rst cause unit costs to fall, not rise.
An increase in basic commodity prices and labour costs will o¤set this, but it will have to persist for a long time before a lot of …rms will perceive that, all things considered, they have experienced a signi…cant and persistent enough rise in unit cost to warrant raising their own prices.
Moreover, once a signi…cant number of prices start to rise, because price-setting is not synchronized, and because the main element of cost to most …rms is the price of the intermediate goods they buy from other …rms, the response of the overall level of prices will be drawn out over a long period of time. Each …rm will wait until enough of its own suppliers have raised their prices by enough, and for long enough, before reacting. What appears like a small delay at the individual level can easily amount to a very attenuated process when aggregated. 10 Because of this, the response of the overall price level, far from being the instantaneous equilibration of demand and supply, will be a delayed and sluggish response to changes in demand and supply. This sluggishness will be ampli…ed by the fact that workers will respond after the fact to rises in the cost of living, and to each others' wages, by insisting on ex post compensation in the form of higher wages for themselves. Every step in this multidimensional wage-price spiral takes time. Thus, as countless econometric studies have con…rmed, in ‡ation will be a highly inertial process -hard to get started and hard to slow down once started.
10 On the mechanics of such processes see Blanchard (1986) .
The story I have sketched above sounds reminiscent of the augmented Phillips curve of textbooks, according to which in ‡ation will accelerate whenever unemployment is below its natural rate. However, the bulk of econometric evidence presented in the recent symposium on the Phillips curve published in the Winter, 1997 issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives provides almost no support for the simple relationship described in the textbooks. Nor does it o¤er any good empirically supported alternative analytical framework for understanding in detail what determines the course of in ‡ation.
Central banks as adaptive agents
In summary, central banks are faced with the problem of trying to regulate a variable (the rate of in ‡ation) whose variations they cannot control except with a long and poorly understood lag and with an uncertain degree of control, and whose movements, once begun, are exceedingly di¢ cult to reverse. They cannot just react ex post to unwanted changes in the variable, because once a signi…cant in ‡ation has arisen it is too late to avoid many of the consequences. They must instead try somehow to anticipate those movements. And the only way this can be done is to search for "leading indicators," that is for statistical clues that will allow them better to foresee incipient trends in in ‡ation.
Over the years this has led central banks to adopt di¤erent strategies using the level of market interest rates, measures of liquidity, exchange rates, the term structure of interest rates, the money supply, commodity prices, measures of unit labour costs, monetaryconditions indices . . . , in their search for a solution to their dilemma. They have followed fads in monetary theory, have deployed various econometric techniques to estimate the temporal structure of the wage price spiral, and so forth. In doing so they have been adapting
to new experience and to developments in economic theory, which in turn have adapted to these di¤erent policy experiments. Moreover, the economy about which central banks are trying to learn keeps changing. Indeed, not only has there been extensive technological change taking place in …nance and commerce, but the very attempt to use leading indicators in the control of in ‡ation has degraded the quality of these indicators, in accordance with the "Lucas critique." As central banks adjust to evidence about the economy, the economy adjusts to these attempts.
Thus a central bank is constantly engaged in a social process of adaptation and learning, a process in which it is just one of the actors, and in which none of the participants has a clear understanding of how the process works or how it is evolving. Some economists would argue that as a profession we have little to say about such a process. And while there is considerable truth in this view, it does not imply that macroeconomists should focus their attention on other aspects of the economy. For the same can be said about almost any other aspect of the working of an economic system taken as a whole. Somehow or another, free enterprise economies have developed mechanisms by which economic problems get solved through the decentralized actions of countless individuals, each acting on the basis of private information and motivation, and none of them with a clear understanding of the overall system in which their actions play a part. We might not yet have much understanding of how this works. But at least we can try to learn from experience.
The same can also be said of central banks, except that they can go one step further.
They can try to learn not just from experience but also from experimentation. And that is what has happened over time, as central banks around the world have experimented at various times with monetary targeting, interest-rate pegging, exchange rate control, in ‡ation targeting, etc. Moreover, it appears as if they have learned something along the way, at least to judge by the way that in ‡ation has come down in the past two decades in almost all OECD countries, to the point where in ‡ation ceases to be a major concern, outside of the …nancial markets in which participants eagerly await in ‡ation statistics not because in ‡ation is a major problem but because it might allow them better to anticipate movements in monetary policy and hence movements in the interest rates and exchange rates a¤ected by central bank actions.
In this respect central banks are aptly characterized by Clark's adaptive model of be-haviour, since they must …nd rules of operation that react quickly to ongoing developments, and adapt to changing circumstances, without the aid of a reliable internal representation of reality. The job of central banking is not just to …nd the right model of the economy and use it to compute optimal instrument settings but rather to design mechanisms for controlling how its instrument settings are going to be regulated, mechanisms that will not just be appropriate for a particular environment but which will also adapt to an environment that changes unexpectedly, often in response to its own changes. This is why even though all central banks in the world make extensive use of macroeconomic models in the process of instrument setting, the model is typically just one input to the process, often supplemented or even overridden by judgement and informal analysis.
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It is also why the models being used keep evolving over time -in Canada from RDX2 to QPM and now TOTEM, a "dynamic stochastic general equilibrium"model much like those in one stage or another of development in just about every central bank in the world.
Moreover, just as the neurons being controlled by human intelligence often send con ‡ict-ing messages that need to be resolved quickly into an action, so the various departments and o¢ cials of a central bank often send con ‡icting messages, and some method must evolve for resolving these into real-time action. All this in a hazardous external political and economic environment that must somehow be manipulated to if the limited and fragmented intelligence embedded within the institution is to result in coherent outcomes.
The case for discretion rather than rules
The main implication to draw from the above view of the nature of central banking is that a central bank could not function e¤ectively if it were bound by rigid rules that determined its instrument settings in every conceivable circumstance. It must be free to use discretion, not so that it can react to changing indicators of the economy, which a complicated enough rule would allow, but more importantly so that it is free to change its strategies when the 11 See Macklem (2002) or Sims (2002) .
evidence shows that these strategies aren't working or that the economy has changed in unforeseen ways, and to adopt promising new ideas for achieving the con ‡icting goals of monetary policy.
To illustrate this case for discretion rather than rules, consider the Canadian experiment with "Monetary Gradualism,"which was started in the fall of 1975 with the goal of bringing in ‡ation down by use of targeted reductions in the growth rate of M-1. This strategy was in conformity with the then academically dominant theory of monetarism, so much so that Milton Friedman (1975) described the speech in which Governor Bouey announced the programme as "the best speech I have ever heard from a central banker."However, the policy foundered when it became apparent that the relationship between M-1, the level of interest rates and the level of nominal income, whose stability was crucial to the e¤ectiveness of the policy, had begun to shift unpredictably.
To some extent bad luck may have played a role in the failure of monetary gradualism.
For it was shortly after the initiation of this programme that technological innovation in banking made it economical for chartered banks to o¤er daily interest checking accounts, which fell outside the de…nition of M-1. Similar technical developments made it pro…table for banks to begin o¤ering sweep accounts that reduced the need for medium-and large-size business …rms to hold their transactions balances in current accounts that were included in M-1. 12 However, in retrospect, it seems that there would probably have been a problem even without bad luck. For, as Charles Goodhart has argued, in every country in which a similar monetary targeting regime was adopted, the empirical "demand function" for the targeted aggregate soon began to fall apart.
The failed attempts at monetary targeting in Canada and elsewhere illustrate well the happened when the Bank learned that the rule was doing more hard than good? Presumably the Bank would have tried to persuade whatever authority was charged with enforcing the rule to revise it, which would hardly have enhanced the credibility that a binding rule is supposed to promote. As it happened, the Bank simply abandoned M-1 targeting and tried something else. The case for discretion over rules is simply that it provides a central bank with the ‡exibility to learn from mistakes this way instead of condemning the bank to repeat them.
In ‡ation Targeting
In February 1991, the Bank of Canada and the Department of Finance announced the new in ‡ation-targeting policy that the Bank has followed, with periodic revisions, ever since. It appears that this policy has been a great success, judging from the fact that in ‡ation came down ahead of the targeted reductions and has remained within a narrow band around 2 percent per year, with a few temporary deviations, ever since. I say that the policy has worked despite the fact, pointed out by Ball and Sheridan (2005) , that in ‡ation targeting countries have not reduced in ‡ation by any more than non-targeting countries since the early 1990s, once one controls for the country's average rate of in ‡ation prior to the in ‡ation-targeting era. My reason goes as follows.
My own interpretation of the evidence presented by Ball and Sheridan is that when central banks around the world were learning to rein in in ‡ation, those that had the most di¢ cult time doing so were those that had the least independent central banks, for the straightforward reasons discussed in section 2.2 above. These countries ended up adopting in ‡ation-targets as a way of reducing the in ‡ationary political pressure on the central bank.
According to this view what was critical was not so much that the central bank signed on to in ‡ation targets but that its political masters signed on. In e¤ect this made the central banks more independent de facto, by increasing their freedom to pursue their objective of low in ‡ation. Thus countries that adopted in ‡ation targets started with higher in ‡ation than non-targeters, because of their low central-bank independence, and ended with in ‡ation rates that looked much like the non-targeters, because of their enhanced de facto independence.
This that means that in ‡ation fell by more on average among in ‡ation targeters than non targeters, not because they started with higher in ‡ation rates and were reverting to the mean but because they were starting with less independence and would not have been able to revert to the mean without the increased independence o¤ered them by in ‡ation targets.
According to this view, those central banks that adopted in ‡ation targets should have been the ones that had the least degree of independence de jure in the pre-in ‡ation-targeting era. This seems reasonable given the countries that adopted in ‡ation targets, such as New 
In ‡ation targeting as a successful adaptation
The adoption of in ‡ation targets by the Bank of Canada can be seen as a successful adaptation to a particular economic and political environment. Of course the general idea of in ‡ation or price-level targeting did not originate with the Bank, having been espoused by Simons (1936) among others, and having been put into practice by New Zealand shortly before the Bank's adoption and by Sweden long before the Bank's adoption. Even the speci…c idea of implementing the policy in Canada in 1991 originated not in the Bank but in the Department of Finance (Crow, 2002) . But the Bank was clearly an active partner in adopting the new policy. As is common with historically embedded cognition, the Bank was economizing on its own internal resources by opportunistically learning from others and following others'suggestions.
The adaptation was successful largely because it dealt with all three of the main di¢ culties facing the central bank. First, the Bank managed to gain extra insulation from political pressure as a result of the move, as argued above, because its political master, the Department of Finance, also signed on. Once these targets had been sanctioned by the Minister there was little scope for him to pressure the Bank into more in ‡ationary policies. Thus even when the Canadian government decided in 1993 that it was politically expedient not to renew the contract of the governor that had become the public face of in ‡ation targeting, it chose to replace him with his former senior deputy, who remained committed to those targets, and under whose regime the measured rate of CPI in ‡ation in Canada remained for several years at or below 1.5% per year.
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As for dealing with the control problem, as many have observed, in ‡ation targeting sharpens the focus of central bank announcements and creates increased transparency. It thereby makes it easier for the Bank to communicate its reasoning to the public, thus allowing people better to anticipate future movements in the overnight rate. The increased transparency also allows people to see that the Bank is really doing as announced, and thus enhances the credibility needed for the crucial announcement e¤ect to work. The announcement e¤ect itself is of course a good example of how an adaptive agency opportunistically manipulates aspects of its external environment, in this case expectations of external private agents, in such a way as to leverage its own limited and fragmented analytical capabilities.
In ‡ation targeting has helped the Bank dealing with its third major problem by allowing 13 See Howitt (1997) . Crow (2002) argues that in ‡ation targeting actually resulted in a decrease of the Bank of Canada's independence because it brought the Finance Department into the process of formulating monetary policy more than ever in the past. Although this does mean a shift of policy-making power from the Bank to the Ministry, I would argue nonetheless that it made it even more di¢ cult than before for the minister of …nance to pressure the bank into …nancing de…cits with highly n ‡ationary policies.
it to continue to learn from experience and experimentation without sacri…cing its own credibility. Recall what happened when the Bank attempted to follow a policy of targeting the growth rate of the money supply in the second half of the 1970s. After having committed itself to targeted reductions in M1 growth, the Bank soon learned that the demand for M1 was undergoing negative shocks which were nullifying the e¤ects of these reductions on in ‡ation. This put the Bank in the awkward situation of having to choose between allowing in ‡ation to persist, thereby defeating the ultimate objective of the policy, or violating its commitment to the targets, thereby undermining its own credibility and reducing its ability to talk in ‡ation down. Nor was the Bank of Canada the only central bank in the world that found itself in such a dilemma. As Goodhart (1984) pointed out, every country in the world that undertook a monetary targeting policy found that the demand for whatever M that they were targeting somehow suddenly started to decrease.
If these central banks had been committed to in ‡ation targets rather than money-growth targets, the lessons that they learned in the 1970s when they tried reducing monetary growth could easily have been put to use without jeopardizing the long-run goal of in ‡ation reduction.
They could have started right away aiming for much lower monetary growth, or switched to controlling some other monetary aggregate, or they could even have abandoned the discredited policy in favor of some other approach to in ‡ation control that placed less reliance on monetary aggregates. In the end that's what many of them did, but only after a lengthy and costly delay caused by the understandable wish to maintain their reputation for constancy.
Moreover, the open and transparent framework of in ‡ation targeting helps the Bank of Canada not just with the control problem, as explained above, but also with the problem of understanding the economy.
what it is doing is just a tactical policy that in no way diminishes its commitment to the publicly announced policy of in ‡ation control, as for example when it abandoned use of its monetary conditions index or when it moved to a schedule of …xed action dates for setting interest rates. In other words, the Bank is now free to bene…t from new information that teaches it something about how the economy works and indicates that a change of tactics is in order, without having to sacri…ce its credibility, rather than having to hope that no such lessons will be forthcoming.
The Game-theoretic view of in ‡ation targeting
In contrast to the account I have just presented, many contemporary accounts of in ‡ation targeting are presented as extensions of the following game-theoretic model, according to which in ‡ation targeting is a rule which, being imposed on the central bank, delivers it from the temptation to deliver surprise in ‡ation. According to this account the central bank that is not constrained by such a rule would use its discretion to yield to this temptation unless expected in ‡ation were so high as to make the cost of the surprise even higher than the gain in terms of reduced unemployment.
A simpli…ed formal model of this game-theoretic view goes as follows. 15 The parameters v; a; and b are all positive. 15 The seminal article from which this game-theoretic approach originates is Kydland and Prescott (1977) . Other central contributions were made by Barro and Gordon (1983), Canzoneri (1985) , Rogo¤ (1985) , Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) and Walsh (1995) .
The central bank sets the rate of in ‡ation each period knowing that the rate of unemployment will be determined by the expectations-augmented Phillips Curve:
Its objective is to minimize the social loss from unemployment and in ‡ation:
According to this consensus model, the key choice of monetary policy consists in choosing the combination of in ‡ation and unemployment that minimizes the social loss (2) subject to the tradeo¤ (1). It is standard to assume that rational expectations prevail, which in this non-stochastic world implies that the expected rate of in ‡ation entering the Phillips curve tradeo¤ will be determined by perfect foresight:
According to this theory, the di¤erence between having an in ‡ation target imposed on the central bank and leaving it free to use its discretion can be modelled as the di¤erence between whether the central bank chooses the actual rate of in ‡ation before or after people form their expectations. Under discretion, people have to form their expectations …rst, and the bank retains the option of varying in ‡ation afterwards. In that case, the central bank will minimize (2) subject to (1), taking the value of e t as predetermined. Thus it will set:
From (3) and (4), the equilibrium values of actual and expected in ‡ation will be:
Suppose, however, that the central bank is constrained by an in ‡ation target. This target determines the rate of in ‡ation t before people form expectations. Whoever sets the target can anticipate that expected in ‡ation will be governed by (3). So according to the Phillips tradeo¤ (1) the rate of unemployment will always equal the natural rate v no matter what target is chosen. In that case, the only variable in the loss function (2) a¤ected by the target will be the rate of in ‡ation, which should therefore be set to its optimal value of zero. Hence: t = e t = 0, under the optimal in ‡ation target.
It follows immediately that having the best in ‡ation target is better than discretion, in the sense that it results in a lower value of the loss function (2). The assumption of rational expectations together with the expectations-augmented Phillips curve (1) imply that in both cases the rate of unemployment will be the same, namely the natural rate v. So allowing the central bank to use discretion just results in a higher rate of in ‡ation, with no payo¤ in terms of lower unemployment.
Many economists have been convinced by this game-theoretic argument, because it does not rely either on mistaken perceptions by the public 16 or on faulty objectives or incompetence on the part of the central bank. The presumption is that the objective being pursued by the central bank is a worthy one, and that everyone is acting in a way that is individually optimal. In e¤ect, the argument portrays discretion as a misplaced softness, like the weakness of a judge that always feel sympathy for a criminal and treats bygones as bygones.
An in ‡ation target is needed to sti¤en the bank's backbone. Failing that we would need to appoint a central banker who had no concern for unemployment, who would act as if the parameter a in the objective function were inde…nitely large, and who would therefore approximate the …rst-best in ‡ation target even though not constrained to do so.
Thus in ‡ation-targeting has been embraced by many monetary economists as a way, although perhaps not the only way, to avoid the useless in ‡ationary bias of benevolent but uncommitted central banks who cannot be counted on to resist the temptation to help society by giving it a bit of surprise in ‡ation. In e¤ect this is exactly the opposite of the adaptive view explained above, for while the game-theoretic analysis would rationalize in ‡ation targeting as a way to use rules rather than discretion, the adaptive view sees them as an example of discretion rather than rules.
The New Keynesian view
I digress brie ‡y to discuss (a simpli…ed version of) the variant of this argument presented by Svensson and Woodford (2005) , who replace the "neoclassical" Phillips Curve (1) by a "New Keynesian"version:
in which what matters on the right hand side is not last period's expectation of this period's in ‡ation but this period's expectation of next period's in ‡ation, with a coe¢ cient less than unity, and where explicit account is taken of the random price-shocks " t . Svensson and Woodford also consider an explicitly dynamic loss function equal to the expected discounted value of (2) for all periods. Using this variant, they argue that the bank needs to be committed to in ‡ation targets not just to avoid the in ‡ation bias of discretion but also to avoid what they call the "stabilization bias"of discretion.
That is, following a positive price shock that disturbed the Phillips Curve, an optimal monetary policy under commitment in the New Keynesian model would require the central bank to accommodate in ‡ation somewhat during the period of the shock but then to bring in ‡ation below target in future periods, even if the price shock were purely transitory. This future tightening of monetary policy would increase future expected losses, but the expectation of lower in ‡ation would allow a more favorable in ‡ation-unemployment tradeo¤ during the period of the shock, and the overall e¤ect of the tightening would be to reduce the discounted sum of expected losses. The problem, however, is that if the central bank is not committed to this future tightening it will not undertake it, since the bene…ts in the form of improved in ‡ation expectations will be bygone. More generally, Svensson and Woodford argue that the optimal in ‡ation target should be history dependent in a way that would never be implemented by a central bank minimizing the "true" social loss function under discretion. Hence the central bank needs to be constrained by a rule that implements the optimal in ‡ation target.
As 
What is lacking, commitment or understanding?
The game-theoretic view that I have just spelled out bears little resemblance to the adaptive view that I outlined in the preceding section. Rather than having to learn about how the economy works, everyone is portrayed as having learned all there is to learn. The struggle to retain control over something that might provide a nominal anchor to the system is assumed 17 See especially section 5 below. 18 The empirical validity of the New Keynesian argument can also be challenged on the grounds that the Phillips Curve (7) on which it is based implies, counterfactually, that in ‡ation should on average rise during recessions. See Fuhrer and Moore, 1995. away by the taking in ‡ation itself as an instrument of the central bank. Instead of learning and adaptation it presents commitment and the resistance to in ‡ationary temptation as the central aspects of monetary policy. The rest of this section presents the case for seeing monetary policy as more a matter of learning than a matter of commitment.
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Consider the theoretical basis of the argument from the previous section. First, it is predicated on the basic idea of the expectations-augmented Phillips curve, and the related idea of the ine¤ectiveness of monetary policy. The reason why discretion yields no payo¤ is that it can be anticipated, whereas the only sort of policy that can a¤ect the economy is that which produces unexpected changes in in ‡ation. As a general proposition, policyine¤ectiveness has long since been discredited by numerous empirical studies, as has the augmented Phillips curve and its prediction of a unique natural rate of unemployment.
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Moreover, there is little reason to think that private expectations enter into the in ‡ation process in the way portrayed by this theory. For although there is some empirical support for the idea that in ‡ation depends upon some measure of economy-wide excess demand for goods and services and on lagged in ‡ation, the lagged in ‡ation terms do not appear to serve so much as proxies for forward looking expectations as for timing delays in the setting of the millions of individual prices that comprise the price index.
21 One seller's price will change with a brief lag when enough other prices of factor inputs and/or competing goods have changed, but as we pointed out above, a succession of small lags can amount to a very sluggish process in the aggregate.
The place where expectations of monetary policy seem to enter most critically is in …nancial markets rather than in the markets for goods and labour services. And when they respond to in ‡ation they do so without delay. If investors begin to suspect that the Bank 19 A similar conclusion has been reached by Romer and Romer (1997) . For another interpretation of US monetary policy that emphasizes learning, see Sargent (1999) . Simultaneous learning by a central bank and private agents is analyzed by Honkapohja and Mitra (2002) . 20 On policy e¤ectiveness, see Boschen and Grossman (1982) . On the Phillips curve, see the symposium in the Winter 1997 issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives. 21 For evidence of this using Canadian wage contract data, see Riddell and Smith (1982) . For U.S. evidence, see Fuhrer (1997) .
of Canada is not committed to a disciplined monetary policy, the …rst thing that happens is that interest rates begin to rise and the exchange value of the Canadian dollar begins to fall.
The fact that expectations of monetary policy can have their most signi…cant e¤ects on the economy instantaneously implies that the game-theoretic model of discretionary policy outlined above has little basis in reality. According to that model, expectations of monetary policy matter mainly in the markets for goods and services, in which wages and prices are often …xed in advance for months or even years. If this were true then it would make sense to suppose as is done in the game-theoretic model of discretion that the central bank can rationally take expectations as predetermined when choosing its policy action. The "temptation"to raise the level of economic activity with some surprise in ‡ation might exist if society were indeed locked into expectations. In reality, however, the temptation just doesn't arise, as practitioners of central banking have long maintained. 22 Central bankers are keenly aware that although there are long and variable lags between monetary stimulus and any resulting rise in the level of economic activity, there are no lags at all between such a stimulus and the currency depreciation and capital ‡ight that will occur if the stimulus is taken by investors as a signal of future weakness in the currency. Because of this, there is no reason for believing that discretionary central banks have the in ‡ationary bias that the game-theoretic view attributes to them.
Another weakness of the game-theoretic model is its assumption that central bank actions are motivated by the desire to minimize a cost function with in ‡ation and unemployment as objectives. 23 Aside from some serious doubts as to the form of that cost function and whether or not it could have anything to do with conventionally de…ned economic welfare, it is doubtful that this is a reasonable description of the motivation of any governor of the 22 See Blinder (1998). 23 As Chuck Freedman has emphasized to me, the way a central bank responds to price shocks, trying to allow some of the e¤ects to come out in in ‡ation and some in real output, make it look as if the bank was trying to minimize a loss function nvolving these two variables. But these short-run responses are part of the detailed implementation of policy having little to do, in my opinion, with the …rst-order questions of keeping in ‡ation anchored and avoiding …nancial collapse.
Bank of Canada or of any other central banker. Instead, I believe the evidence favours the account that has been given over the years by such astute observers as Thornton (1802) , Bagehot (1873) and Milton Friedman, 24 namely that responsible people entrusted with such important and delicate jobs as the management of a country's central bank are typically motivated by the desire to be seen as having done a good job, to have acquitted themselves well. They pursue this objective by doing everything possible to avoid major in ‡ations, …nancial panics, and runs on the currency, while carrying out the day to day job of making available the base money needed for the …nancial system to function.
The evolution of monetary policy
If we trying to counteract short term movements in nominal interest rates. As Friedman argued, this policy was almost guaranteed to amplify the rise in unemployment when aggregate demand fell, and to add momentum to in ‡ation in the face of either supply or demand 24 Friedman has been cited indirectly on this subject by King (1997) .
shocks that started an incipient in ‡ation spiral. In making this criticism, Friedman was reopening a debate that goes back to the "real bills doctrine"espoused by Adam Smith and others, a debate that is still unresolved, and which involves the fundamental con ‡ict referred to above between the two main tasks of central banks.
Friedman's insistence that central banks pay strict attention to conventional monetary aggregates was treated by conventional Keynesians in the early 1970s as crankish nonsense.
Monetary policy was largely in ‡uenced by those Keynesian ideas and by the related Radcli¤e view according to which monetary policy was largely ine¤ective because conventional monetary aggregates were only one component of the multidimensional notion of "liquidity" that really in ‡uenced the level of aggregate expenditures in the economy, to the extent that these were in ‡uenced at all by …nancial considerations. It would be hard to …nd a monetary economist today that did not agree that Friedman was right, and did not agree that high in‡ation is certain to occur in a situation in which all known monetary aggregates are growing persistently at rates between 15 and 25 percent per year. Yet in the early 1970s in Canada such was the situation, and the then governor of the Bank of Canada, Louis Rasminsky apparently saw no reason to change course.
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Rasminsky was not a lover of in ‡ation. Nor was he by all accounts a man of weak resolve easily given to short-run temptations. He just made an honest mistake. He saw the need to preserve "orderly markets," which led him, like Martin and other central bankers at the time, to pursue a strategy of dampening interest rate movement. He didn't see the con ‡ict between this strategy and the goal of avoiding a disastrous in ‡ation.
The next governor of the Bank of Canada, Gerald Bouey, apparently saw things di¤er-ently. He set out on the course of "Monetary Gradualism," that was described in section 2 above, which foundered when the targeted M-1 aggregate began to exhibit an unstable relationship with interest rates and nominal income. What ruined monetary gradualism was not lack of commitment but lack of understanding. And so it has been in case after case. 25 See Courchene (1976) .
The disappointments that we have seen in monetary policy have largely been the result of error, not deception.
Moreover, the history of central banking has been one of trial as well as error. When mistakes have been made, central banks have learned from them, as have economists. We have learned that interest rates must often be allowed a wide latitude from time to time, and that when all monetary aggregates start growing at high rates in ‡ation is sure to follow if nothing is done to reverse course. We have learned that a policy of publicly focussing on a single aggregate is not enough, because once people get used to the new regime, the chosen aggregate will cease to be indicative of the overall level of aggregate demand.
Another aspect of monetary policy that can be explained by seeing it as a question of trial and error rather than strategic manipulation is the apparent herd instinct of central Of course many people in uncertain situations will strike out on uncharted courses that 26 I have argued this in greater detail in Howitt (1993 There is another feature of this herd behaviour that is easy to understand from the point of view of this essay, and that is its rough coincidence with developments in monetary theory.
In the 1960s, central bankers were guided largely by Keynesian ideas. In the 1970s and 1980s, they seemed to take their inspiration from the monetarism that had then become so popular in academic writings on macroeconomics. In the 1990s the proliferation of in ‡ation-targeting can be seen as a direct extension of the Kydland-Prescott game-theoretic analysis, for one solution to the conundrum of time inconsistency, as indicated above, is to delegate monetary policy to a central bank with a "contract" mandating the pursuit of a speci…c range of in ‡ation. In all these cases, the globalization of monetary theory has implied that what can best be rationalized in terms of conventional wisdom in one country is the same as in another, at least in so far as conventional wisdom accords with academic fashion.
As another example of something more easily explained by the adaptive view of monetary policy than by the game-theoretic view, consider the fact that economists have been pro¤ering policy advice to central bankers over the years. in ‡ationary spiral, the immediate rise in in ‡ation that would accompany the blip threatened to undermine the Bank's credibility. In ‡ation targets were seen at …rst as a means for dealing with this problem. More speci…cally, the Bank estimated the …rst-round e¤ect of the new tax on the price level, under the assumption that the path of wages would not be a¤ected, and the policy was designed to limit the price blip to that estimated amount. In ‡ation targets were announced after the blip had had its …rst-round e¤ect, rising to about six percent, and the announcement promised to halt this rise and to bring in ‡ation gradually down to within a one to three percent band over the coming three years.
When I …rst heard this announcement, and for some times afterwards, I was very skeptical. Along with many other academic economists I thought it was foolish for the Bank to announce that it was going to control something like in ‡ation, which it can only a¤ect through a long and variable lag, with such a high degree of precision. To me the idea reeked of …ne-tuning, and I thought the Bank was setting itself up for a fall. I should add that 27 On this point, see Rymes (1979) .
although David Laidler also had qualms, he was much more supportive than I was (see Laidler, 1991) . As usual, he showed better judgement than I did, because in the end the Bank managed to contain the price blip just as planned. The price level stopped rising and then in ‡ation quickly came down to within the target range, where it has been almost continuously ever since. This is just one example of how central banks seem to have learned a lot during the past half century without the support of academic economists. In the United States, for example, economists often poked fun at the Greenspan method of sifting through all sorts of data with no apparently coherent guidance from economic theory. But there is no disputing his success in maintaining a low course of in ‡ation, even in circumstances (with unemployment dipping below 4%) where established theory was predicting that in ‡ation was going to accelerate.
When the most successful central bankers appear to pay little attention to economic theory, and the economic theory which seems to rationalize the success of in ‡ation targeting is riddled with empirical contradictions, it is reasonable to infer that something is wrong with theory, not practice. It suggests that in the social process of adaptation in which both practitioners and students of monetary policy play a role, the students now have more to learn from the practitioners than the other way round. Now such a situation would not appear anomalous to anyone familiar with the historical relationship between science and technology, where fundamental scienti…c breakthroughs have been the result rather than the cause of successful innovations made by practical people solving mundane problems, often with little or no understanding of why the innovation works. 28 In ‡ation targeting seems to work, and we are still waiting for a full blown monetary theory that can provide an empirically successful explanation of this practical experience.
Monetary theory has fallen behind practical experience partly because instead of taking money seriously as a critical part of an economy's coordination mechanism it has been 28 See Rosenberg and Birdzell (1986) . Laidler (1999a, esp. pp.323 ¤.) makes a case that textbook IS-LM analysis is another example of theory following practice. What others have called the Keynesian "revolution" is in Laidler's analysis a theoretical synthesis of various ideas and proposals that had sprung up in the decades preceding Keynes's General Theory, many of them in response to urgent policy concerns. mesmerized by a priori ideas like rational expectations. This hypothesis does more to hide than to illuminate the process of learning and adaptation that lies at the heart of monetary policy and of much else in economic life. For it asserts that there is only one correct theory of how the economy works, and central banks know it as well as anyone else. 29 The fact that this assumption has appealed equally to new classicals and new Keynesians, whose views of how the economy works are in fundamental contradiction with one another, has not apparently reduced its popularity in either camp. But it has put modern monetary economics out of touch with the reality of monetary economies.
As central bankers continue to improve their methods they will …nd less and less need to continue to pay lip service to academically fashionable economic theory that cannot account for that success. But there are plenty of problems remaining with in ‡ation-targeting.
One is the vexing question of how to deal with asset-price bubbles, about which much has been written. Another is the problem of the loss of early warning signs of in ‡ation in an environment where in ‡ation expectations have become entrenched. Speci…cally, with in ‡a-tion having become 2% plus white noise, all leading indicators of in ‡ation have lost their predictive power, including measures of in ‡ation expectations, monetary aggregates, core in ‡ation and the output gap. The best predictor is just 2%. Moreover, as in ‡ation becomes more entrenched private forecasters have less and less incentive to spend resources trying to predict something so predictable, and as a result asset prices and expectational surveys no longer re ‡ect much information coming from peoples'forecasting activities. But as we have emphasized above, given the intertial nature of in ‡ation, the policy of in ‡ation targeting depends very much on early warning signs. Latent in ‡ationary pressure can build up for a long time before its symptoms become apparent, and once they do become apparent they are very costly to reverse. So the more our leading indicators continue to deteriorate the more danger we face of waking up one morning and …nding that we have been unknowingly fostering a vigorous in ‡ation that can only be eliminated by a prolonged economic slowdown. In that 29 On the same point, see Laidler (1999a, xi-xiii) sense, conducting monetary policy is becoming more and more like trying to ‡y an airplane blindfolded without crashing, and central bankers are facing the very di¢ cult problem of …nding a way to operate without feedback, a problem that in ‡ation targeting has done more to create than to solve.
So, adaptive central banks will still be looking to academia for answers for some time, even as they continue to look for answers on their own. Moreover there is a growing literature on learning in macroeconomics 30 that takes the adaptive view of economic life, some of it devoted explicitly to questions of monetary policy. So economic theory still has a chance to catch up with the practical lessons being learned by central banks. If it does catch up this will be because of people that follow the path that David Laidler has always been on, constructing and judging theories according to their explanatory power rather than according to conventional a priori beliefs, and taking seriously the role of money as a central institution of economic life.
30 See for example, Evans and Honkapohja (2001) .
